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DIVERTING THE COURSE OF COLORADO
RIVER: A RECONCILIATION OF
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ADAPTATIONS
MICHAEL W. PINSOF* &
RICHARD A. WOLFE**

Inherent in the conferral by Congress of diversity jurisdiction upon federal district courts in 1789 was the potential for the
pendency of simultaneous proceedings in state and federal
courts by parties to a single dispute. Early in our federal jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court observed that, "the
pendency of an action in state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same subject matter in the federal court having
2
jurisdiction."1 In its most recent pronouncement on the subject,
* J.D. DePaul University College of Law 1979; B.A. University of Iowa
1976; Member Chicago Bar Association; Associate with Wolfe & Polovin,
Chicago, Illinois.
** J.D. DePaul University College of Law 1972; B.A. University of Illinois 1969; Member Illinois State Bar Association and American Bar Association; Partner of Wolfe & Polovin, Chicago, Illinois.
The law firm of Wolfe and Polovin represented Ontel Corporation
before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The authors wish to express
their gratitude to the law firm of Blau, Kramer, Wactler & Lieberman, P.C.,
Jericho, New York, for its cooperation and assistance.
1. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910).
2. On February 23, 1983, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case entitled Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S.Ct.
927 (1983). In Cone, the petitioner (a hospital located in North Carolina)
filed an action against the respondent (a construction company with its
principal place of business in Alabama) in North Carolina state court, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that there was no right to arbitration
under the construction contract between the parties, and that the petitioner
was not liable to the respondent. The state court issued an ex parte injunction forbidding the respondent to take any steps towards arbitration, which
was dissolved after the respondent presented its objections. The respondent then instituted an action in North Carolina district court, jurisdictionally founded upon diversity of citizenship, wherein.it sought an order
compelling arbitration under section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act
of 1925 (9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976)). The district court stayed the action pending
resolution of the state court's suit because the two suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the respondent's claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, finding that it derived appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), reversed the district court's stay order and
remanded the case with instructions to enter an order to arbitrate. In re
Mecury Const. Corp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981). Before addressing the
substantive issue, the Supreme Court (in an opinion delivered by Justice
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the Supreme Court underscored the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them, 3 notwithstanding the pendency of a parallel proceeding in
state court. In Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States 4, the Court formulated certain factors to be balanced by district courts in determining those rare occasions
when sufficient "exceptional circumstances" are present to jus5
tify the renunciation of their "duty" to exercise jurisdiction.
Since Colorado River was decided, the district courts have
adopted divergent applications of the "balancing test" articulated by the Supreme Court when confronted with a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay federal proceedings in deference to a parallel suit pending in state court. This division of
authority has culminated in a trilogy of seemingly conflicting decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rendered over a
period of three months. The first and most controversial of the
three, Microsoftware Computer Systems, Inc. v. Ontel Corp.,6 appears, at first, to cast serious doubt upon the continued vitality
of Colorado River in the Seventh Circuit by virtue of its plurality decision that under certain circumstances a district court is
required to stay its proceedings in deference to a parallel state
action. In Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Corp.,7 and Evans Transportation Co. v. Scullin Steel Co. ,8 two unanimous and separate
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panels reached seemingly
contradictory holdings, founded upon a strict adherence to the
mandate of Colorado River. This article will trace the district
Brennan, in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined) held that the district court's stay order was appealable as a
"final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Turning to the principal issue, the
Court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting the stay.
After reaffirming the continued validity of the "exceptional circumstances"
standard promulgated in ColoradoRiver Water Cons. Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976), the Court undertook to apply the factors set forth in that

case. The Court concluded that the applicable factors of the exceptional
circumstances test, i.e., avoidance of piecemeal litigation and the order in

which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums, failed to demon-

strate sufficiently exceptional circumstances to justify the district court's
stay. Moreover, the fact that federal law would govern the issue of the arbitrability of the dispute in either forum militated against the district court's
stay order. Finally, an important reason dictating against allowing a stay
was the probable inadequacy of the state suit to protect. the respondent's
rights, since it was doubtful that the respondent could obtain from the state
court an order compelling the petitioner to arbitrate.
3. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976).
4. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
5. Id. at 818. See infra note 43-46.
6. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982).
8. 693 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
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court cases which followed in the wake of Colorado River, analyze and attempt to reconcile the Ontel, Voktas and Evans decisions and propose an analytical framework for evaluating future
cases.
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS:
AN OVERVIEW

Definition and HistoricalPerspective
The terms "parallel proceedings," "duplicative litigation,"
and "the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction" are used interchangeably throughout this article to refer to the simultaneous
prosecution of two or more suits in which at least some of the
issues and parties are so closely related that the judgment of
one will necessarily have a res judicata effect on the other.9 In
the first type of res judicata effect, "claim preclusion," a final
and valid judgment disposing of a particular claim of a party is
deemed conclusive.' 0 Second, "issue preclusion" or collateral
estoppel, makes a judgment conclusive as to any issue actually
litigated and determined when that issue was essential to the
judgment."
In the context of parallel actions pending concurrently in
state and federal forums, the underlying tenet which has pervaded judicial thought since 1821 is that federal courts must
hear all cases which satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. In
Cohens v. Virginia,12 Chief Justice Marshall stated in dictum:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution .... We have

no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given
than to usurp that which is not13given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution.
The rationale advanced in support of the foregoing rule was that
the jurisdictional statutes bestow upon a federal court plaintiff
whose action satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites an "absolute right" to a federal forum, and imposes upon the court a correlative obligation to proceed to judgment on the plaintiff's
9. Wilson, FederalCourt Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel
State Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 641

(1977).
10. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 45(a), (b) (Tent.

No. 1, 1973).
11. Id. at Section 45(c).
12. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).

13. Id. at 404.

Draft
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14

claim.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to
the notion that a federal court has an obligation to exercise its
jurisdiction once it is properly invoked, 15 this doctrine has been
substantially undercut by the gradual expansion of the three
"iconventional prototypes" of the abstention doctrine. 16 The
traditional abstention doctrines emerged from general principles of federalism, reflecting the concern that in certain instances federal/state comity outweighs any interests favoring
adjudication of disputes in the plaintiff's chosen forum.' 7 Although a discussion of judicial abstention is beyond the scope of
this article, its significance from an historical perspective lies in
the gradual erosion of the "absolute right" doctrine whereby a
federal court is required to provide a forum to a litigant who
properly invokes its jurisdiction.
Types of ParallelProceedings
Parallel proceedings can be categorized into two types: "re14. See Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752 (N.D. Ill.
1928).
15. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910); Wilcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1940).

16. See C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs 218

§ 52

(3d Ed. 1976); Note, JudicialAbstention and Exclusive FederalJurisdiction:
A Reconciliation, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Jurisdiction];Note, Abstention and Mandamus after Will v. Calvert
Fire Insurance Co., 64 CORNELL L. REV. 566 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Abstention]; Wilson, supra note 9. According to Professor Wright, the three
"conventional prototypes" of judicial abstention have been invoked to
(1) avoid federal constitutional decisions where potentially dispositive
state law question is presented; (2) avoid needless conflict with state administration of state affairs; (3) allow state courts to resolve unsettled questions of state law. WRIGHT, supra, at § 52.
The seminal case for the first branch of the abstention doctrine directed
the federal court to abstain from deciding federal constitutional claims until
a state court has resolved unclear, potentially dispositive state law issues.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See C. WRIGHT, supra
§ 52 at 218-21; Field, "Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine," 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077-79 (1974). The
second branch is illustrated by Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). In that case, the Supreme Court approved
deferral to a state tribunal for a determinative ruling on state policy of first
impression. The third traditional branch is derived from the Supreme
Court's more recent holdings in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). This branch prohibits federal
courts from interfering with pending state actions involving the enforcement of important state laws, and turns on principles of comity. See C.
WRIGHT, supra, § 52 at 229-36; Redish, "The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris:
Deference in Search of a Rationale",63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978).
17. Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 16, at 221.
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active" and "repetitive". 18 This classification provides a significant normative factor in the analytical framework which is
proposed later in this article and serves to highlight some of the
practical problems which are inherent in concurrent litigation.
Repetitive actions are successive suits based upon the same
claim filed by a plaintiff against the same defendant in two different forums. A plaintiff may desire to file repetitive suits for
harassment purposes, to insure against the risk that the first
court will not obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 19
to obtain certain benefits of forum shopping, 20 or to gain a tactical advantage. 21 Additionally, a second duplicative action may
be used by a plaintiff who has received an adverse ruling in a
prior suit which is not res judicata.22
Conversely, reactive suits are instituted by the defendant in
the initial action against the original plaintiff for the purpose of
asserting an affirmative claim that arises out of, or is closely related to, the same transaction or occurrence from which the initial plaintiff's action arose. Among the reasons advanced for
filing reactive suits are the supposed tactical advantages inherent in proceeding as a plaintiff,23 the advantage or disadvantage
of proceeding in a particular forum based upon perceived
prejudices, 24 and the choice of law rules in the second forum
18. This terminology is taken from Vestal, Repetitive Litigation,45 IowA
L. REV.525 (1960); Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REV. 11 (1961). See

also Wilson, supra note 9, at 642-44.
19. See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 330 (10th Cir.
1972); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty &Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33,
36 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
20. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203
(2d Cir. 1970); Mars, Inc. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1201, 1204
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
21. See, e.g., Beard v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 607, 610 (N.D.
Ohio 1957). See also Ystueta v. Parris, 486 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ga. 1980),
where the court held that the "plaintiffs' [expressed] desire to obtain the
earliest trial date possible . . . [was] not sufficient reason to justify" the

pendency of virtually identical repetitive actions in state and federal courts,
when viewed in light of "the duplication of effort and expense which would
be involved for counsel, the litigants and the courts if both suits were actively pursued."
22. See, e.g., Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326, 328
(W.D. Pa. 1974) (dismissal on ground of laches).
23. See Vestal, Reactive Litigation, supra note 18, at 13-14.

24. See, e.g., Caribbean Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 273 F.
Supp. 598 (D.P.R. 1967), vacated 387 F.2d 498 (1st Cir. 1968). Perceived

prejudice in the state forum is aptly illustrated in Miles v. Grove Mfg. Co.,
537 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Va. 1982), in the context of repetitive suits, where,
during the course of discovery in the state case, it became desirable for the

plaintiff to depose two witnesses who resided in Pennsylvania. In his brief
filed in district court in response to defendant's motion to stay the federal
action, the plaintiff alleged that he feared the Pennsylvania judge, when
confronted with a motion to compel the witnesses (allegedly prominent lo-
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that might result in the application of more favorable substan25
tive law.
The Development of Policies Underlying Federal Court
Abeyance to ConcurrentState Proceedings
The traditional abstention doctrines do not directly confront
the jurisprudential concerns inherent in concurrent litigation in
state and federal courts. 26 The traditional abstention doctrines
were justified by deep-rooted notions of comity and federalism.
The emergence of federal court abeyance to concurrent state
proceedings, however, is based on pragmatic considerations,
such as the additional "expense and misappropriation of judicial
resources inherent in duplicative litigation. '27 In other words,
the federal judge stays the action pending the resolution of the
parallel state action because it is wise and sensible to do so.
In Landis v. North American Co ,28 the Supreme Court first
recognized the power inherent in federal courts to stay their
proceedings in deference to actions pending in other federal
courts. 29 The Court based its decision on considerations of judicial economy and convenience. A number of lower courts extended Landis to include stays granted in deference to parallel
state proceedings.3 0 An examination of these cases, which recognized at least some discretionary power in the federal courts to
stay federal actions in deference to parallel state proceedings,
reveals certain recurring policies.
In the absence of federal court abeyance, duplication and
waste of judicial resources is inevitable. Because of the resjudicata effect of the first action to be concluded on the unresolved
parallel action, a race to the courthouse may result. 31 Duplicative proceedings may also provoke undesirable procedural taccal citizens) to appear for their depositions, would be "overly deferential to
their sentiments" and refuse to order their depositions be taken. Id. at 886.
The court summarily rejected this allegation. Id. at 890.
25. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 676
(5th Cir. 1973).
26. See Wilson, supra note 9, at 651.
27. See Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 16.

28. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
29. Id. at 254-255.
30. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th

Cir. 1973) (equity suit stayed pending outcome of parallel state proceeding); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) (stayed on plea of

forum non conveniens).
31. See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill &Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 817, 820
(9th Cir. 1975).

19841
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and increase the caseload of already overburdened federal
33
dockets.
Of course, there may be competing policy arguments which
dictate against a federal court's abeyance in deference to concurrent state proceedings. For example, one of the litigants may
be hampered by the state court's more restrictive discovery
rules. Therefore, the federal forum, with its far-reaching discov34
ery capabilities, would be the preferable forum for litigation.
Additionally, the defendant in the state court action may have a
bona fide affirmative claim based on a statute vesting exclusive
35
jurisdiction in the federal courts.
The Colorado River Standard
In Colorado River, the Supreme Court articulated a standard to govern the circumstances in which a federal court may
relinquish its jurisdiction in deference to a pending state proceeding to avoid duplication of judicial effort and ensure that the
controversy is adjudicated in the forum best able to make a com36
prehensive and dispositive decision.
The litigation in ColoradoRiver was commenced when the
United States filed suit in federal court to obtain an adjudication
of its rights to certain bodies of water situated'in the State of
Colorado. 37 At the time the government instituted the federal
action, it was concurrently involved in water rights litigation in
several Colorado state courts. 38 After the federal suit was fied, a
party to a related state proceeding joined the United States in
39
the state litigation pursuant to the McCarran Amendment.
32. See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 194 (2d Cir.
1955) (Medina, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (responsible people
may make wholly unfavorable offensive and defensive claims with
impunity).
33. See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill &Co., 521 F.2d at 820.
34. See Note, Stays of FederalProceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684, 705-06 (1960); see also Voktas,
Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982).
35. See generally, Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 16.
36. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 817-18.
37. Id. at 805.

38. Id. at 806.
39. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). The McCarran Amendment provides for joinder of the United States as defendant in suits for the adjudication of water
rights, and provides in pertinent part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or
other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law, by purchase, by
exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to
such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be
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The district court then dismissed the federal action in deference
to the pending state proceeding to which the United States had
been made a party. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court should not have
abstained. 40
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision, holding that the district court's dismissal of the action
was proper.4 1 The Court underscored the "virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them" when confronted with a motion to dismiss in deference to
a parallel state action.4 2 To justify the dismissal of a federal action, the Court stated that exceptional circumstances must be
present.4 3 The Court articulated the following factors which are
relevant to the determination of whether exceptional circumstances exist: (1) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;4" (2) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the
concurrent forums; 45 (3) the inconvenience of the federal forum;46 and (4) a preference for the first court assuming jurisdic47
tion over any property which may be involved in the suit.
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of

its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and
decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof,

in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided,that no judgment for costs shall be

entered against the United States in any such suit. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
40. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974) rev'd sub nom.,
Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
court of appeals held that the McCarran Amendment simply allowed the
government to be joined as a defendant in a state water rights action in
which it was a necessary party and did not by implication prohibit the
United States from litigating its water rights as a plaintiff in federal court.
Id. at 118-19. The court also concluded that the district court should not
have abstained, emphasizing that the federal action had been filed first and
that jurisdiction was based on the presence of the United States as plaintiff.
Id. at 120-22.
41. Colorado Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 820-81.
42. Id. at 817-18, citing, England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Cohens v. Virginia, 219

U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
43. Colorado Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 818.
44. Id., citing, Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
45. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 818,
citing, Pacific Livestock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 447 (1916).
46. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 818,
citing, Gulf Oil Corp., v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
47. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 818,
citing, Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida v.
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); United States v. Bank of New York, 296
U.S. 463, 477 (1936).
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In Colorado River, the decisive factor in the Court's decision to uphold the dismissal of the federal suit was "the clear
federal policy" demonstrated by the McCarran Amendment:
"the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a
river system". 48 The Court ruled that the consent to suit provision in the McCarran Amendment evinced a congressional policy judgment that the state courts are adequate to adjudicate
49
federal interests in water rights cases.
Although the factual scenario of the case is unique, the
Court's discussion of the "principles governing the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction" has far-reaching implications. The Supreme Court sanctioned, for the first time, the
primary consideration of "wise judicial administration" in the
context of federal court abeyance in deference to pending state
court proceedings. 50 The Court also made it clear that a stricter
standard should be applied by federal courts to federal court
abeyance to parallel state court suits, as51contrasted with concurrent proceedings in two federal courts.
Colorado River sets forth the factors which are to be balanced against the obligation to exercise federal jurisdiction in
determining whether "exceptional circumstances" are present
so as to justify a stay in deference to a parallel state proceeding.
However, the Supreme Court provided minimal guidance in the
application of the balancing test, thereby necessitating the application of a substantial degree of latitude and discretion by
federal district courts.
THE WAKE OF COLORADO RIVER

The cases preceding the Seventh Circuit trilogy of decisions, and following Colorado River, reveal a patchwork of conflicting district court applications and interpretations of
Colorado River. While one line of cases strictly construed the
limitations imposed upon a district court's discretion to defer to
a state court where parallel proceedings were pending, 52 other
48. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 819.

49. Id. at 819-20.
50. Id. at 817-18.
51. Id. at 818.
52. See Browning v. United States Movidyn Corp., 83 F.R.D. 211 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (in an action demanding payment of notes and for declaratory
relief based upon diversity of citizenship, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss due to the pendency of a concurrent state court action commenced by the defendant, based in part, upon its finding that there was

some doubt as to whether the issues raised in the concurrent actions were
completely similar. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate
the "clearest of justifications" to entitle it to dismissal, and that the potential for duplication and piecemeal litigation cannot in and of itself be consid-
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district courts strained to yield jurisdiction to the state court by
broadly interpreting the discretion conferred upon them by Col53
orado River.
The first approach, wherein the district court demonstrates
an extreme reluctance to find the "exceptional circumstances"
necessary to warrant a stay, is well illustrated by the case of
Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc.54 In Gentron, an
action was commenced in New York state court to recover commissions allegedly due and owing pursuant to a contract between the parties. 55 Subsequently, the defendant in the first
suit filed a separate action against the New York plaintiff in Wisconsin state court.56 The Wisconsin proceeding was then removed to federal district court where the defendant moved to
stay the Wisconsin federal proceeding pending the resolution of
57
the New York state action.
In Gentron, the court felt constrained by Colorado River
from abdicating its jurisdiction notwithstanding the explicit recognition by the court that, "the New York state action was commenced first, that continued adjudication of this action may
result in piecemeal litigation, and that it will certainly result in a
duplication of effort. ' 58 In apparent contradiction to its ultimate
holding, the court also observed that the case before it "involves
no federal claim at all," and for that reason it is also a less appealing case for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and that
"[t]here is no apparent reason why the New York state court
cannot adjudicate in the action before it all issues raised in this
'59
action.
ered exceptional circumstances necessary to override the court's obligation
to exercise its jurisdiction); Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc.,
79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See infra note 54-60.
53. See Ystueta v. Parris, 486 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (in wrongful
death action based upon diversity of citizenship, defendants moved to compel an election between the district court action and a substantially identical state court action ified on the same date, or, in the alternative, to stay
the federal proceedings pending the completion of the state action. The
court held that inasmuch as the party opposing the stay had the power to
exercise his preference for a federal forum without the aid of the court, the
issuance of a stay should, within the sound discretion of the court, be
granted, to promote the court's interest in controlling and managing its
docket); Burrows v. Sebastian, 448 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also,

Holmes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 505 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Centronics
Data Computer Corp. v. Merkle-Korff Indus., 503 F. Supp. 168 (D.N.H. 1980).
54. 79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Wisc. 1978).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
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Nevertheless, the Gentron court denied the motion to stay,
and held, "the clear import of the Colorado decision . . . is that
exceptional circumstances must be present to justify the nonexercise of federal jurisdiction, once it is properly invoked. A
'60
duplication of effort, while wasteful, is not exceptional.
In contrast to Gentron, the decision of Judge Nicholas Bua
61
of the Northern District of Illinois in Burrows v. Sebastian signaled a departure from the Colorado River mandate requiring
the presence of exceptional circumstances before a federal court
can defer to a pending state action. In Burrows, the plaintiffs
filed an action in Indiana state court to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained.62 Subsequently, the same
plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois seeking recovery for injuries suffered in the same occurrence naming two
additional parties defendant and adding a prayer for punitive
damages. 63 In the subsequent federal action jurisdiction was
based upon diversity of citizenship. 64 The defendants in the
state court action then fied a motion to dismiss in the federal
65
court in light of the prior pending similar state court action.
In Burrows, the court noted that the case involved a repetitive, rather than a reactive suit, in that both the state and federal
actions had been brought by the same plaintiffs. 66 In such a situation, Judge Bua reasoned, a stay of the federal suit simply
placed the plaintiff in the position of having to elect the forum in
which he desired to proceed, and in no way infringed upon his
right to have his claims adjudicated in federal court. 67 In such
instances, the court stated, "it cannot be said that there has
been any abrogation, justified or otherwise, of the court's 'duty'
to exercise its jurisdiction. Hence, such an order does not re' 68
quire 'exceptional circumstances' to be warranted.
The district court in Burrows granted the stay requested,
and held that the absence of a duty to exercise jurisdiction calls
for a "much more liberal granting of stays. . . in order to 'avoid
duplicative litigation.' "69 Thus, the Burrows decision marked
the first significant departure from the Colorado River constraints in the district court's formulation of a new, more liberal
60. Id. at 418.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

448
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
at 52.

at 53.
at 53-54.
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test to be applied to cases where the grant of a stay would not
result in the denial of a federal forum to the federal court
plaintiff.
Given this divergent line of cases, it is not surprising that
the Seventh Circuit reached seemingly conflicting holdings in
three cases involving only subtle factual distinctions. Whereas,
in Voktas and Evans, the court strictly adhered to the "exceptional circumstances" test in holding that the district court
should not entirely abrogate its jurisdiction, in Ontel, the court
put forth the unprecedented proposition that a district court is
required, under certain circumstances, to stay its proceedings in
deference to a parallel state court suit. Whatever "common law"
can be synthesized from these three decisions, it cannot be disputed that the unprecedented Ontel holding altered the course
of the already turbulent waters of Colorado River in the Seventh Circuit. The remainder of this article will address itself to
the question of whether the three cases can be reconciled and
used collectively to provide a foundation for precedent and a
policy to evaluate future cases.
THE ONTEL DECISION

Ontel, a New York Corporation, filed an action in the
Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York, alleging that
Microsoftware Computer Systems, Inc. (MCS), an Illinois corporation, owed it money for goods delivered pursuant to a written contract which provided, inter alia, that New York law was
to govern.70 Some two months later, MCS filed an action against
Ontel in the Northern District of Illinois founded upon diversity
of citizenship, alleging various common law theories, and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices
Act.7 ' Each count of the district court complaint related to the
same transaction that was the subject of the New York state action.72 The record on appeal indicated that the claims averred
by MCS in the district court were raised in substantially similar
form, by way of an answer and counterclaim in the state court
73
action.
Ontel then moved the district court for the entry of an order
staying the proceedings, pending a final disposition of the New
York state action.74 The district court denied the motion,
70. Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 533

(7th Cir. 1982).
71.
72.
73.
74.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, §§ 261-369 (1981).
Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 533.
Id.
Id.
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Ontel's subsequent motion to reconsider, and Ontel's motion to
appealed the denials to the
certify the question on appeal. Ontel
75
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Chief Judge Walter Cummings, writing for the majority in
Ontel, was confronted with the preliminary issue of whether the
order denying the stay was appealable. Ontel contended that
the order denying the stay should be deemed equivalent to an
order refusing to grant an injunction and, therefore, immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1). 7 6 Citing various
practical 77 and historical 78 reasons, the court treated the order
75. Id.

76. 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,
except where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ....
With few exceptions, since the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789, only
final decisions have been appealable. Absent outright dismissal of the federal action, or alternatively, unless the stay effectively terminates the litigation, a district court's grant or denial of a stay does not ordinarily result in a
final order, and hence is not appealable. Appellate courts usually refuse to
treat a district court's ruling on a motion to stay the federal proceeding as a
final order, because after the state court has rendered a judgment, the litigant can return to the forum that issued the stay and litigate his unsettled
For a general discussion of appealability stay orders under
claim.
§ 1292 (a) (1), see Mayton, Ersatz FederalismUnder the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUm. L. REV. 330 (1978).
77. Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 534-35
(7th Cir. 1982). The primary practical reason noted by the court is that the
decision not to stay is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. A secondary practical reason is that there has been considerable disagreement among the district courts of the Seventh Circuit regarding when
proceedings should be stayed in deference to parallel state proceedings
which, the court presumes, stems from its failure to provide any guidance
on the subject. Id.
78. Id. at 535. Historically, the court observes, whether an order granting or denying a stay could be appealed as an order granting or denying an
injunction depended on the character of the underlying dispute and the putative basis for the stay. Under the "Enelow-Ettelson" rule the crucial issue
is whether the underlying cause of action is one which before the merger of
law and equity was by its nature at law or in equity. In addition, the court
observes, some courts have engrafted a second prong to the test of appealability of an order granting or denying a stay. Not only must the underlying
action be legal rather than equitable, but "the stay must have been sought
to enable the prior determination of an equitable defense." Lee v. Ply*Gem
Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967.
The court in Ontel finds that the underlying action is clearly legal in
nature and that the stay was requested to interpose an equitable defense,
the equitable basis for such a defense being the avoidance of unnecessary
and wasteful duplication of litigation. Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v.
Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 535-36. Cf., Texaco, Inc. v. Cottage Hill Operating
Co., 709 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1983), where the Court of Appeals distinguished
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denying the stay as an injunction for purposes
of § 1292(a) (1)
79
and assumed jurisdiction over the appeal.
Turning to the substantive issue, the court noted the enormous discretion and latitude possessed by district courts in
these matters and emphasized that its holding was in no way
meant to "criticize the care with which the district court here
reached its decision." 80
Citing Burrows as authority, the court posited as the first
factor warranting the stay pending the outcome of the New York
action, the absence of a "federal" interest that would justify litigating a duplicate case in federal court as opposed to a single
case in state court.8 1 In support of its thesis that there was no
"federal interest" present, the court pointed to the fact that federal jurisdiction in the case was founded solely on diversity of
citizenship, and thus the applicable law was exclusively state
law. 82 Additionally, the historical justification for federal diversity jurisdiction (the avoidance of possible prejudice against out
of state defendants on the part of foreign state courts), was not
present, the court observed. 83 Had MCS desired to avoid
prejudice of the New York state court, or preferred to litigate the
dispute in federal court for any other reason, it could have removed the state action instead of creating a second, duplicative
one.84
The second and third factors enunciated by the court in
Ontel to support its decision to grant the stay were the priority
in time of the state court filing and the absence of evidence that
the state court could not adequately resolve the dispute.85 The
court went on to express its concern that one or both of the parties in either forum may "attempt to accelerate or stall the proceedings in order to influence which court finishes first," the
result of which would be "quite similar to forum shopping, and
Ontel, finding that the parties to the two suits are different and resolution of
the state court's suit would not render the federal proceedings unnecessary.
Accordingly, the court declined to extend the Ontel analysis pertaining to

the second prong of the Enelow-Ettelson rule to the facts in Cottage Hill
and concluded that the district court's order denying the motion to stay was
not appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Id.
79. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 536.
80. Id. at 537.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Because MCS was an out-of-state defendant whose citizenship
was diverse with that of the state court plaintiff (accordingly, the District
Court of New York possessed original jurisdiction), MCS could have removed the state action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
85. Id. at 538.
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is just as unseemly. ' 86 Further, the court voiced its preference
for preventing the "potential abrasive[ness] of the spirit of federal/state comity" which might be caused by the district court's
proceeding at full tilt while an identical action was pending be87
tween the same parties in state court.
The final factor which weighed in favor of the court's decision to reverse the district court's denial of the stay was the
"grand waste of efforts by both the courts and parties in litigating the same issues regarding the same contract in two forums
at once. '88 The efforts required to proceed with the federal action, the court stated, must be viewed as additional because it is
not likely that the state court would stay its proceedings in deference to the later-fied federal action. 89
District Judge James Doyle (from the Western District of
Wisconsin sitting by designation) filed a strongly-worded dissenting opinion in Ontel wherein he chastized the manner in
which the majority "turns on its head" controlling precedent
and 375 years of historical development. 90 The heart of Doyle's
dissent was that an occasional waste of judicial resources arising from duplication of effort was outweighed by the value
served by having a separate system of federal jurisdiction. 9 1
Judge Doyle, in choosing to strictly apply the dictates of Colorado River, framed the issue in terms of "whether the district
court was free to exercise its discretion in a conservative manner, to move in the mainstream, obedient to its virtually unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." 92 Doyle argues that
the effect of the majority's holding "is to effect a substantive
change in the distribution of power between the national court
system and the court systems of the states." 93 "[TJhis distinctively unexceptional case," argued Doyle, "fails miserably as the
of a new limitation upon the
occasion for the pronouncement
'94
power of the national courts.
THE VOKTAS DECISION:

A RETURN

TO COLORADO RIVER?

The opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Voktas, authored by a
86. Id.
87. Id., citing, Ystueta v. Parris, 486 F. Supp. 127, 129 (W.D. Ga. 1980).

88. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 538.
89. Id.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 539.
Id.at 538-39.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 540.
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visiting district court judge, 95 is somewhat perplexing because it
initially failed to cite the previously-decided Ontel case, even
though Judge William Bauer joined the majority in both decisions. Although the court subsequently issued a footnote to
Voktas evidencing its consideration of Ontel, a glaringly feeble
attempt was made to reconcile the two cases and to enunciate
guidelines governing the discretion of federal courts to stay
their proceedings in abeyance to pending state court actions.9
The litigation in Voktas commenced when a Greek corporation filed a products liability action in Indiana state court
97
against an Indiana corporation and a Panamanian corporation.
Three months later, the same plaintiff instituted a virtually identical suit in federal district court in Indiana, alleging diversity of
citizenship as the sole basis for federal jurisdiction. 98 The
defendants filed a motion to stay the federal action pending the
outcome of the state court suit, which was denied by the federal
magistrate9 9 and certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). 10 0
While the appeal was pending, the state court stayed all proceedings before it "pending disposition of the parallel proceeding ... in the U.S. District Court."'u 0 The court of appeals noted
that the apparent reason for the stay of the state court proceedings was the concern of the state court judge about the adequacy of resources of the state court to handle such a complex
0 2
suit which involved voluminous discovery in distant locations.
Due to the foregoing developments, the court of appeals observed, the appeal involving the denial of the motion to stay the
federal proceedings in deference to the state court action was
"close to being moot."'10 3 Moreover, the court noted, a reversal of
the federal magistrate on appeal would practically result in "judicial paralysis," where neither court would be in a position to
04
proceed to a resolution of the dispute.
95. Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982). The

Honorable Earl R. Larson, Senior Judge of the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota, was sitting by designation.
96. Id. at 105, n.6. Footnote number 6 of Voktas was issued by the Court
some two weeks after it rendered its slip opinion. Id.
97. Id. at 104.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).

101. Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., No. C-80-26 (Cir. Ct. DeKalb
County, Ind., Dec. 23, 1981).
102. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 104-05.

103. Id. at 105.
104. Id.
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Nonetheless, the court in Voktas proceeded to address the
merits of the appeal and considered whether the federal magis10 5
trate abused his discretion in denying the motion for a stay.
In light of the foregoing facts, which by the court's own admission rendered its decision moot for all practical purposes, the
court's legal analysis on the dispositive issue must be read cautiously. However, the court left no doubt that the special obligation of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction must be
strictly observed to conform with ColoradoRiver. The court of
appeals affirmed the denial of the stay and held that the magistrate properly applied the ColoradoRiver balancing test and did
not err by failing to consider the best use of judicial resources
and the additional burden of the federal discovery sought by the
plaintiff. 10 6 In confirming the vitality of the Colorado River standards, the court in Voktas flatly rejected the approach of the
court in Burrows, which "equated the stay of a repetitive federal
action in deference to state proceedings with the stay of a federal action in the presence of a concurrently pending federal action."' 0 7 In the former situation, the Voktas court held that
federal courts have a "heightened duty" to exercise jurisdiction
which cannot be abrogated unless "exceptional circumstances"
are demonstrated. 0 8
In its footnote (issued shortly after the decision in Voktas
was rendered) the court of appeals relied entirely on the fact
that the state court had stayed its proceedings to reconcile the
Voktas decision with Ontel. Whether this application of Voktas
is a subtle cue from the Seventh Circuit that Voktas should be
limited to its facts, remains to be seen.
THE EVANS REMAND: A RETREAT FROM ONTEL

Factually, the Evans case was, at the time arguments were
heard by the Seventh Circuit, virtually identical to Ontel. However, the court of appeals, in a unanimous opinion written by
Judge Richard Posner, astutely chose to consider the merits of
the appeal in the scenario as it existed at the time the district
court dismissed the underlying district court action. 10 9 This enabled the court to address the substantive issues of a justiciable
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 107-108.
Id. at 108; Burrows v. Sebastian, 448 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.N.H. 1980).
Voktas, Inc., 686 F.2d at 108-109. See Colorado River Water Cons.

Dist., 424 U.S. at 817.
109. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718-19 (7th Cir.

1982).
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controversy, and yet avoid overruling the district court by rendering an outright reversal.
The initial action was brought in Missouri state court by
Scullin Steel Company (Scullin) seeking damages for fraud and
breach of contract against Evans Products Company. 110 One
month later, Evans Transportation Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Evans Products, commenced suit in Illinois federal
district court against Scullin for breach of the same contract. 111
Jurisdiction in the federal action was based solely upon diversity of citizenship, the federal plaintiff being an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, and Scullin
being a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi1 12
ness in Missouri.
Scullin moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the
federal suit, contending that the federal suit would be inconvenient to have to defend the federal suit while prosecuting the
concurrent proceeding in Missouri state court. 1 13 The district
court granted Scullin's motion and dismissed the suit "with
leave to reinstate should it become apparent that the Missouri
4
action cannot resolve the controversy between the parties.""
1 5
Evans Transportation appealed.
The record on appeal revealed that subsequent to the issuance of the order of dismissal by the Illinois district court, Scullin amended its complaint in the Missouri state action to add
Evans Transportation (the federal court plaintiff) as a party defendant. 116 Having been duly joined in the state court suit, Evans Transportation successfully removed that action to federal7
district court in Missouri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)."1
Scullin then moved to remand the case to Missouri state court,
arguing that the presence of Evans Products (like Scullin, a Delaware corporation) in the state suit, precluded removal to federal district court. This motion was still pending before the
110. Id. at 716.

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 530 F. Supp., 787, 789 (N.D. ill.

1982).

115. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d at 716.
116. Id.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United State have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
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Missouri district court when the Seventh Circuit rendered its
decision.
Addressing the propriety of the order on review, the court of
appeals chastized the lower court's decision to dismiss, rather
than stay, the underlying federal action. The court noted that if
the state suit "wash[ed] out," the party who properly invoked
the jurisdiction of the federal court "ought to be allowed to get
back in." 118 Moreover, the statute of limitations might preclude
the federal court plaintiff from reinstating the suit after a dismissal. Such would not be the case if the suit was stayed. 19
The court of appeals viewed the facts of the case as they
appeared to the district court when it ordered the dismissal and
determined that all the lower court knew or could have known
was that the defendant had, one month prior to the commencement of the federal suit, instituted an action arising out of the
same contract which was at issue in Missouri state court against
an affiliate of the plaintiff. 2 0 Finding the record devoid of any
evidence of forum shopping on the part of the federal court
plaintiff, the court concluded that, "the principal basis on which
the district court decided to give priority to the Missouri state
court action was simply that it had been filed a month earlier
21
than the federal suit.'
Moreover, the federal court plaintiff could not, at the time
the order of dismissal was entered, have removed the state suit
to federal court because it was not a party to the suit. Its parent
company, who was the original party defendant in the state proceeding, also could not have removed because it was a citizen of
the same state as Scullin. 122 Accordingly, the court of appeals
stated, since the record failed to indicate any evidence of bad
faith on the part of the federal court plaintiff in commencing the
subsequent federal suit, the Illinois federal court was not only a
jurisdictionally proper forum, but was the only federal forum
123
open to Evans Transportation.
The foregoing consideration, that of providing access to a
federal court, played an important role in the Evans decision
and formed one of the primary bases for the court's distinction
between Evans and Ontel. Judge Posner observed that the procedural posture of Evans at the time of the lower court dismissal
118. Evans Transp. Co. v. ScuUin Steel Co., 693 F.2d at 717-18.

119.
120.
121.
122.
aware
123.

Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.
Both Evans Products Company and Scullin Steel Company are Delcorporations with their principal place of business in Missouri. Id.
Id. at 718.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:49

was different from Ontel in that the issue before the court in
Ontel was not whether the federal court plaintiff would have access to a federal forum, but which federal forum it would have
access to. 124 In such instances, the court stated, "considerations
of judicial economy become decisive, for there is no question of
1 25
depriving a litigant of his right to litigate in federal court."'
However, in basing his distinction between Ontel and Evans
on the premise that Illinois was the only federal forum available
to Evans Transportation, Judge Posner appears to have made a
126
critical misstatement. Pursuant to the federal venue statute,
the federal court plaintiff in Evans could have originally filed its
127
suit in Illinois, Missouri, or Delaware federal district court.
Thus, the federal court plaintiff in Evans, like the federal court
plaintiff in Ontel, had a choice of federal forums which it could
have gained access to. The key distinction to note is that using
access to one particularfederal forum in Ontel would have fostered the interests of judicial economy by having the controversy heard by one court, while at the same time preserving the
right of the federal court plaintiff to a federal forum. The dispute existing at the time the district court in Evans ordered the
dismissal could not possibly have been resolved by one court
due to the lack of identity of parties.
It is significant to note that the reactive federal suits in both
Ontel and Evans were fied in a different forum than the state
court proceeding. Not coincidentally, in each case the subsequent action was commenced in the district court sitting in the
state of citizenship of the federal court plaintiff. In Ontel, the
court based its reversal of the denial of the stay, in part, upon its
124. Id. at 719.
125. Id.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only
in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in
which the claim arose.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation

for venue purposes.
127. The plaintiff "resided" in Illinois, and the defendant "resided" in
Missouri and Delaware, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. For diversity purposes, the federal court defendant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, is deemed a citizen of both states. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c). Accordingly, the federal defendant can be sued in the federal district courts of either state. Additionally, as the court noted, the

cause of action arose in Missouri, by virtue of the fact that the contract was
signed and performed there. Venue was proper in Illinois, because the federal court plaintiff was an Illinois corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois.
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finding that access to another federal forum by way of removal
eliminated any interest which the federal court plaintiff may
have had in commencing its action in a federal forum.1 28 In Evans, notwithstanding the availability of two alternate federal foof the
rums to the plaintiff, the court held that the dismissal
129
federal action, even if treated as a stay, was improper.
Rather than reversing the district court dismissal outright,
the court of appeals remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether a stay should be entered in light of the events which
had transpired in the Missouri state court litigation subsequent
to the dismissal. 130 In dicta, the court speculated on certain factors which, on remand, might be weighed by the district court.
One of the facts mentioned by the court was that, because the
contract was signed and performed in Missouri, the substantive
law which would most likely be applied by a federal court was
that of Missouri. 13 1 Another factor which, if found to be present,
would weigh in favor of a stay, was the greater convenience of
the Missouri forum for witnesses.132 An additional factor which
would have warranted abeyance to the Missouri action, but apparently was not present, was if the Missouri state court action
33
was closer to trial than the Illinois district court proceeding.
Although the court of appeals criticized the district court
judge's election to dismiss rather than stay the federal suit, the
court in Evans may be attempting to convey a message to the
district court judge on remand that factors warranting a stay
may well have been present, and that a stay may well have been
within the court's discretion. The presence of such factors, however, was not expressly set forth. The presence of a previously
filed state proceeding, and the judicial inconvenience and lack of
economy inherent in a subsequently filed parallel federal action,
were insufficient, without more explicit findings of fact, to warrant a stay of the federal suit.
128. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 537.
129. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 718.

130. Id. at 719.
131. Id. at 720. The court applied the rule of the forum state (Illinois)
pertaining to conflicts of laws as it is required to do under the doctrine of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Applying the holding in Cook
Assoc's., Inc. v. Colonial Broach &Machine Co., 14 111. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d
27 (1973), the court in Evans found that the law of Missouri, the state where
the contract was performed, would govern, and would prevail over the law
of the forum state. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 720.
132. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d at 720.

133. Id.
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AN ATtEMPT TO RECONCILE THE FOREGOING DECISIONS

As a prerequisite to the formulation of an analytical frame-

work in which to depict the current state of the law in the Seventh Circuit, an attempt must be made to reconcile the Ontel,
Voktas, and Evans decisions. More specifically, this section will
seek to analyze the extent to which the breadth and scope of the
Ontel opinion is limited by the decisions which followed it. This
analysis is impeded by the unique transpiration of events in the
state court proceedings in both Voktas and Evans, while the appeal was pending, which in each case played a vital role in the
ultimate decision of the Seventh Circuit.
In a procedural context, an important distinguishing factor
between Ontel and Evans on the one hand, and Voktas on the
other, is that in the latter case the state court plaintiff also initiated the subsequently filed federal action. Employing the vernacular explained previously, the federal suit in Voktas was
"repetitive" rather than "reactive." In and of itself, this may well
be a distinction without a difference since, as noted above, there
is the potential for abuse and the possibility of undesirable consequences in either context.
When a repetitive suit is commenced in federal court by a
party who has already initiated litigation against the same defendant in state court, there exists an expressed policy determination that it is not unfair to make the plaintiff abide by its
initial choice of forum.1 34 In Voktas, the court expressed its determination that, at least where the state court has stayed its
proceedings, and the federal forum is better able to handle complex discovery in foreign countries, the obligation of a federal
court to exercise jurisdiction outweighs this policy and overrides any duplication of effort which may occur when a plaintiff
is allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of both a state and federal
13 5
court to resolve the same controversy.
In Voktas, it must be reemphasized that the repetitive federal suit commenced by the plaintiff was brought in a federal
district situated in the same state as the previously filed state
court suit. 136 This fact serves to obfuscate the "forum shopping"

concern which played such a prevalent role in the court's reversal of the denial of a stay in Ontel. In both Ontel and Evans, the
court notes that the substantive law which would have to be applied by the district court is that of the forum in which the paral134. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. at 107-108, n.2 quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1078, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 1 (1886). See also Wilson, supra note
9, at 666-667.
135. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 105-108.
136. Id. at 104-105.
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lel state suit was previously filed. 137 Conversely, in Voktas the
district court in the repetitive action was able to apply the law of
13 8
the state in which it was situated.
As noted earlier, the court of appeals, in its footnote to
Voktas acknowledging Ontel, did not enunciate the rather obvious distinctions suggested herein. The court relied instead
upon the fact that the state court had already stayed its proceedings because of the state judge's perception that the federal fo1 39
rum was better suited to complex international litigation.
Notwithstanding the court's dependence upon the facts which
transpired in the state court suit in Voktas, the decision provides a point of reference on one end of a hypothetical spectrum
which serves to illustrate a situation in which a district court
judge has virtually no discretion to defer to a parallel state court
suit and must exercise its jurisdiction. In such situations, the
court in Voktas left little doubt as to the necessity of "exceptional circumstances" to warrant abeyance to a parallel state
suit.
Because only a defendant can invoke the removal procedure,14° the ability to remove a concurrent state action is not
germane to the situation where a state court plaintiff chooses to
commence a repetitive suit in federal district court. In this context, the district court is merely called upon to decide whether
one party should be entitled to simultaneously litigate its claim
against another party on two judicial tiers.
Where it is the defendant in the state court proceeding who
institutes the federal (reactive) suit, the ability of that party to
remove the state court suit to federal district court in the first
instance becomes a crucial consideration. If a federal forum is
available to the state court defendant by way of removal jurisdiction, the stay of a reactive federal suit would not have the
effect of denying that party access to a federal forum. This concept, when considered in conjunction with the developments in
the Missouri state proceeding in Evans, can be used to reconcile
the Ontel and Evans decisions.
137. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 533; Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 719-720.
138. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 103.
139. Id. at 105.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). The plaintiff may not remove even if the

defendant in the state court asserts a federal defense or counterclaim. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1894) (defense);
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106-107 (1941) (counterclaim). The plaintiff cannot remove by asserting that the counterclaim is a

separate and independent cause of action under § 1441(c). Lee Foods Div.
v. Bucy, 105 F. Supp. 402, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
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It will be recalled that in Evans certain procedural developments in the Missouri state action, subsequent to the dismissal
of the Illinois federal suit, caused the court of appeals to remand, rather than reverse outright, the order of dismissal entered by the district court. 14 1 Evans Transportation, the federal
court plaintiff, joined as a party defendant in the state court suit,
proceeded to remove the action to Missouri federal district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.142 By exercising the removal procedure, the state court defendant in Evans did precisely what the
state court defendant was able, but failed to do, in Ontel. Because the federal court plaintiff succeeded in gaining access to a
federal forum by removing the Missouri state court action, the
court of appeals in Evans no longer felt duty-bound to allow the
federal court plaintiff the unconditional right to have its claim
resolved in an Illinois district court, and remanded the case for
further consideration.

143

If it is conceded that the federal court plaintiff in Evans did,
in fact, have other forums available at the time it instituted the
reactive federal suit, then it is possible to discern a policy from
the reconciliation of Ontel with Evans. This policy is that, for a
federal court to defer to a state court, the federal forum must be
available to a federal court plaintiff in a reactive suit by way of
removal of a parallel state court action, and not merely by the
availability of alternative forums for commencement of a reactive suit. Accordingly, it is the ability of the federal court plaintiff to remove the state action which may ultimately be pointed
to as the distinguishing factor between Ontel and Evans. Where
removal is available, as in Ontel, considerations of judicial economy dictate that the dispute be resolved by one court. Where
such is the case, the obligation of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction in a parallel federal suit may be outweighed by considerations of judicial economy. Where removal is not available
to the federal court plaintiff, Evans would seem to mandate the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in a parallel suit, notwithstanding the availability of alternate federal forums with proper original jurisdiction, and the resultant duplication of judicial
resources.
In Evans, the court refused to consider the existence of factors which could very easily have been inferred from the facts
and circumstances in the record. This reluctance presents a
stark contrast to the Ontel opinion in which the court seems at
times to almost reach for facts and infer motivations to justify its
141. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 719-720.

142. Id.
143. Id.
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holding. Although the district court's supporting rationale for
its decision in Evans 144 is noticeably sparse, the court of appeals
on review understated the evidence before the district court
when it observed that the "principal basis" for the district
court's decision to defer to the state court action was that it had
145
been filed first.
In Ontel, the court was far more willing to infer bad faith
and a forum shopping motive from the federal court plaintiff's
actions. This judicial activism may be explained and justified by
the failure of the federal court plaintiff to invoke the removal
procedure to gain access to a federal court, although clearly
available. When access to a federal court can be gained in this
manner, thereby rendering unnecessary the filing of a duplicative federal action, the Ontel decision would seem to stand for
the uncontradicted proposition that a federal court must stay its
proceedings in abeyance to the parallel action pending in state
court. If removal is, for whatever reason, unavailable to the federal court plaintiff in a reactive suit, the policies underlying
Ontel must give way to the duty of a federal forum to exercise
jurisdiction, unless "exceptional circumstances" are present.
This duty would appear to preclude a federal court from deferring to a parallel proceeding pending in state court, even where
other federal forums are available to the federal court plaintiff
for the commencement of its reactive suit.
Thus, where a federal district court abrogates its jurisdiction by staying its proceeding in deference to a parallel state
proceeding, the "exceptional circumstances" warranting such a
stay must be specifically and thoroughly set forth by the district
court judge. Clearly, priority of filing the state court suit and
judicial inefficiency are, absent additional factors, insufficient to
trigger abrogation. Where the case falls within the precise scope
of Ontel, the "exceptional circumstances" test is inapplicable,
and a much less stringent test encompassing considerations of
judicial economy and efficiency is employed. By its very nature,
removal of the state action, when available, will foster these interests. In such circumstances, the obligation of the district
court is directly contrary to its normal "unflagging" obligation to
exercise jurisdiction, and it must, under Ontel, stay its proceedings in abeyance to a parallel state action. 146
144. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 530 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill.),
rev'd, 693 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
145. Evans Trans. Co., 693 F.2d at 718.
146. This analysis is supported by the recently-decided case of Mechanical Sys., Inc. v. Cadre Corp., 567 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. 111., 1983), wherein Judge
Milton Shadur stated in dictum: ". . . as Evans makes clear,
Microsoftware's abstention formulation is applicable in situations involving
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The Ontel decision has carved out a noteworthy exception
to the "unflagging obligation" of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction while a parallel action is pending in state court. Although the breadth of that exception seems to have been
somewhat limited by the subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions
in Voktas and Evans, it cannot be questioned that, at least in the
Seventh Circuit, a new framework must be formulated in which
to analyze future cases. The framework suggested herein marks
a substantial departure from the "balancing test" enunciated in
Colorado River. If other circuits elect to follow the Ontel holding, the approach suggested in this article should provide a
greater degree of certainty and consistency to the law in this
area and provide much needed guidance to federal district court
judges.
The approach, which may be most practical in the aftermath
of Ontel, Voktas and Evans, is a "sliding scale" of discretion. It
consists, at each opposite end, of situations where the district
court has little or no discretion. The middle of the scale, in
which most cases undoubtedly will fall, would be comprised of
those factors the Seventh Circuit has expressly considered in
applying and interpreting Colorado River. An attempt will be
made to "weigh" those factors, in order of perceived importance,
by placing them closer to one opposite end of the scale or the
other, depending on how they affect the district court's
discretion.
The Ontel case signifies the end of the scale on which the
district court has virtually no discretion to exercise jurisdiction;
in such instances the court must stay its proceedings in deference to a concurrent state court action. The sine qua non of a
case falling within the Ontel end of the scale is the ability of the
plaintiff in a reactive federal suit to remove the concurrent state
court suit to federal district court. If, at the time the state court
action was commended, the defendant is able to gain access to a
federal forum by way of removal, then the stay of a subsequently filed reactive federal suit would not effectively deny that party
access to a federal forum. Hence, a subsequent attempt by the
state court defendant to gain access to a federal forum by insticoncurrent federal and state proceedings only if the defendant in the state
suit (who is also the plaintiff in the federal action) eschewed an opportunity
to remove the state suit to a federal forum." Id. at 950 n.3. In Mechanical
Systems, the state court defendant, being a citizen of the state in which it
was sued, could not, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), remove a diversity action to
federal district court. Id. at 950. Accordingly, the court declined to apply
Microsoftware's "less stringent standards" of deferral to a parallel state action. Id.
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court
tuting a separate action must be stayed by the district
147
suit.
state
concurrent
the
of
resolution
the
pending
At the Ontel end of the scale, it can be argued without contradicting the Voktas decision, that the applicable standard is
equivalent to that standard applied where there are parallel actions pending in two or more federal courts. This equation, first
suggested by Judge Bua in Burrows, was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Voktas because it failed to consider the "special
148
obligation of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction."'
However, this rejection was expressly limited to repetitive proceedings. 149 In Evans, a reactive case where the federal court
plaintiff had temporarily successfully removed the state court
action, resulting in two pending federal actions in different
states regarding the same claims, the court notes, "[T]hat
makes no sense, and of course a stay of one [federal action]
would not deprive anyone of access to the federal courts."' 50 Accordingly, a stay of a reactive federal action can be granted
where the plaintiff could have removed the parallel state court
suit without minimizing or ignoring the "special obligation" of
the federal court to exercise jurisdiction.
Thus, in order to obtain a stay of a reactive suit, the federal
court defendant (state court plaintiff) need not demonstrate
''exceptional circumstances," but must at least show that the
federal court plaintiff could have obtained a federal forum by
means other than the commencement of the reactive federal
proceeding. These interests will always be served by a stay of
the reactive federal suit where the exercise of the removal procedure will result in the resolution of the dispute in one federal
forum.
At the opposite end of the scale are situations where the district court has virtually no discretion to stay its proceedings in
abeyance to a concurrent state court action and is thus required
to exercise jurisdiction. This extreme is clearly illustrated by
the Voktas case where the state court stayed its proceedings in
147. This end of the analytical framework proposed in this article was
applied quite narrowly by District Judge Susan Getzendanner in her recent

opinion in the case of Architectural Floor Prod. Co. v. Don Brann &Assoc's.,
Inc., 551 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In Architectural Floor, the court rejected the applicability of Ontel, noting that "Ontel is not a case of wide
application". Id. at 805. The court in Architectural Floor held that, due to

the inability of the state court defendant to remove ("complete" diversity
did not exist, as certain co-defendants were citizens of the same state as the
plaintiff), the federal interest underlying the grant of diversity jurisdiction
could be served only by allowing the federal action to proceed. Id.
148. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 108.
149. Id.

150. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 719.
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deference to the repetitive federal action because of the advantages the federal discovery rules provided to complex litigation
involving parties of international citizenship. 15 1 In this procedural context, the obligation to provide the litigants with a federal forum for the resolution of their disputes is nearly absolute.
A federal court is still constrained by the "unflagging obligation" to exercise its jurisdiction, unless the case falls within the
Ontel context. This remains the underlying policy consideration in the application of those factors in the middle of the "sliding scale." With the benefit of the three recent Seventh Circuit
decisions, it is now possible to define with a greater degree of
specificity those circumstances which are truly "exceptional"
enough to justify the exercise of a district court judge's discretion to issue a stay. Unlike the simple "laundry list" of factors
enumerated by the Supreme Court in the course of propounding
its balancing test, an attempt will be made to place at a particular locus on the "sliding scale" certain factors expressly considered by the Seventh Circuit in its trilogy of decisions.
In the broad range between the opposite ends of the scale
discussed earlier, the district court judge possesses a wide latitude of discretion, subject at all times of course, to its "unflagging obligation." Although a case may not fall within the exact
Ontel scenario because of the inability of the federal court plaintiff to remove the concurrent state court action, there exists a
range of discretion in which the district court judge may exercise his discretion in favor of a stay.
The factor aligned closest to the Ontel end of the scale is the
ability of the state court to fully and fairly resolve the dispute
between the litigants. When this factor is present, in conjunction with the priority of filing of the state action, and the presence of at least one of the "middle range" factors set forth below,
the district court should be free to exercise its discretion in
favor of a stay.
If the district court record lacks evidence pertaining to the
relative ability of the state court to dispose of the controversy,
then the district court should consider certain factors which
may necessitate "reading" beyond the record. For example, the
court in both Ontel and Evans found that the substantive law to
be applied in each case was the law of the forum in which the
state court is situated. The state court will normally be more
familiar with its own substantive law than will a federal district
court situated in another state. Consequently, the law to be ap151. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 105-107.
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plied in a given case may militate in favor of a stay of the federal
action.
Another factor which the courts should consider in determining the ability of the state court suit to adequately resolve
the litigation, is whether the matters at issue are governed exclusively by state law or whether any of the claims involve federal statutes. The determinative factor in this analysis is
whether the federal jurisdiction for the action is based upon diversity of citizenship, or the presence of a bona fide federal
question. In Ontel, the absence of a federal interest played a
significant role in the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the district
court's denial of the stay. Moreover, such a consideration is supported by the weight of authority. 52 In Evans, however, the
court implicitly rejected the notion that federal courts should
grant stays more readily where federal jurisdiction is founded
solely upon diversity of citizenship:
...[U]ntil Congress decides to alter or eliminate the diversity jurisdiction we are not free to treat the diversity litigant as a secondclass litigant, and we would be doing just that if we allowed a
abstention in a diverweaker showing of judicial economy to justify
153
sity case than in a federal question case.
Notwithstanding this dicta from Evans, the absence of a federal
interest in a reactive federal suit is a proper factor for the district court judge to consider in his determination of whether to
grant a stay in deference to a parallel state suit.
Moving away from the Ontel extreme toward the middle
range of the imaginary scale of discretion, the district court
judge, faced with a motion to stay in abeyance to parallel state
proceedings, should consider the motivations of the federal
court plaintiff in bringing the federal action. In Voktas, the court
cited with approval its previous decision in Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 5 4 for the proposition that the perceived vexatious and dilatory nature of the federal suit is a significant
contributing factor supporting a district judge's decision to grant
a stay.155 In Evans, the court went so far as to scrutinize the
substantive allegations of the complaint in the state court action, which acknowledged that the federal court plaintiff had
complained about the quality of the goods before the other party
instituted suit in state court.' 5 6 Thus, the court concluded that
152. See Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D.
Wis. 1978). See also Miles v. Grove Mfg. Co., 537 F. Supp. 885 (D. Va. 1982).
153. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 717.
154. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 655

(1978).
155. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 109.
156. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 719.
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there was no evidence of bad faith in the commencement of the
57
federal action by the state court defendant.
At the fulcrum of the imaginary scale are factors which, although not to be weighted heavily in the district court judge's
exercise of discretion, may, if all other factors are relatively
equal, tip the balance one way or the other. The first consideraion to be placed in the middle range of the scale is whether, as
in Ontel, a "grand waste of efforts by both the courts and parties"'1 8 would result by concurrently litigating the same issues
in two forums. Although duplication of efforts is singularly dispositive in the Ontel context, where removal is available to the
federal court plaintiff, this factor is substantially less important
in other applications. The court in Evans shrugged off the loss
of judicial economy inherent in duplicative litigation and observed that it may be the "unavoidable price" of providing diversity litigants with their right to a federal forum under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.15 9 In Voktas, the court affirmed the denial of the stay
notwithstanding its express recognition of the finding of the
magistrate that, "a grant of the motion for stay would result in a
1 60
better use of judicial resources.
Another factor in the middle range of the scale to be accorded weight similar to that accorded considerations of judicial
economy, is the relative convenience of the state and federal forums to the parties and witnesses. Where, as the court observed
in Ontel, the geographical distance between the two forums
would necessitate either hiring two sets of attorneys or commuting long distances, this factor may be very important.' 6 1 Conversely, relative convenience is virtually inconsequential in a
situation such as in Voktas, where the repetitive federal action
was instituted in the federal district in which the state court was
situated. 162 It is instructive to note that the court of appeals in
Evans expressly criticized the "brief reference" by the district
court to the convenience of the parties. 63 Accordingly, if the
district court weighs this factor in reaching its decision to grant
or deny a stay, it must consider it thoroughly.
Located slightly off center of the range of the scale balancing in favor of exercising federal jurisdiction, is the proximity of
the state court suit to trial at the time the federal action is com157. Id.
158. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 538.
159. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 720.
160. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 107.
161. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 538.
162. Id. See also Miles v. Grove Mfg. Co., 537 F. Supp. 885 (D. Va. 198).
163. Evans Transp. Co., 693 F.2d at 720.
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menced. In Evans, the court noted that the proceedings were
"neck and neck" in that the state action was no closer to trial
than the federal action which had been filed only one month
thereafter. 164 Even prior to ColoradoRiver, the court in Evans
noted that stays of federal actions were limited to cases where
parallel state proceedings were well underway at the time the
federal suit was filed.165 Thus, a finding that the previously filed
state action is no closer to final disposition than the parallel federal suit will weigh in favor of the concurrent exercise of federal
jurisdiction.
Within the discretionary range approaching the end of the
scale mandating the exercise of federal jurisdiction, are the concerns brought to light in Voktas. In Voktas, the advantages of
the federal rules of discovery in resolving complex international
litigation ultimately caused the state court to stay its proceedings. 166 Similarly, these considerations would weigh heavily in
favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the face of a motion to stay pending the resolution of a state action involving
claims better suited in federal litigation.
When federal jurisdiction is founded upon an exclusive
grant, such as those contained in the Securities Act of 1934,167 or
the Clayton Act,168 the desire for uniform and effective administration of the federal statutes should strongly suggest the exercise of federal jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of
other factors which would warrant a stay. 169 Hence, this factor
may be placed at a locus on the scale very close to the Voktas
extreme where the district court has virtually no discretion to
order a stay.
CONCLUSION

The course of ColoradoRiver has been altered by the recent
trilogy of cases decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rather than diverting the course in any one direction, the Seventh Circuit has created two branches of Colorado River which
flow in opposite directions from the source. At the source is the
underlying policy that a district court must fulfill its unflagging
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967); Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees Union Local No. 338 v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n,
Inc., 304 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1962).
166. Voktas, Inc., 689 F.2d at 105.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).

168. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
169. See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537 (3d
Cir. 1975); McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.
1975). See also Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 16 at 219.
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obligation to exercise jurisdiction, unless exceptional circumstances are present. Branching out from the source in one direction is the newly formulated requirement that the district
court stay its proceedings where facts similar to those existing
in Ontel are present. In the opposite direction flows the branch
represented by Voktas, wherein the district court must provide
a federal forum where jurisdiction is properly founded. The
middle branch, and most widely travelled, represents the broad
latitude of discretion possessed by a district court judge when
faced with the choice of whether to stay its proceedings in abeyance to a parallel state court action. This branch is limited at
each bank by Ontel and Voktas, which impose limits on the district court judge's exercise of discretion.
The branches of Colorado River represented by the divergent opinions which have evolved from the Seventh Circuit are
as yet uncharted. The analytical framework suggested herein
should serve to establish more cogent guidelines to be applied
by district courts in choosing whether to exercise jurisdiction or
grant a stay. It is anticipated that the course of ColoradoRiver
and its various branches will rapidly become apparent as interpretive case law develops.

